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the insurance coverage which the company purported to
sell for the premium paid. For, if the company chose to
issue the policy with a narrower exclusion clause after
similar narrow clauses had been construed by the courts
as above indicated, it is not unfair to assume that the com-
pany had appraised the risk accordingly.
SHOULD REVERSAL OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION
BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, UNDER
THE NEW CRIMINAL RULES, BE WITH OR
WITHOUT A NEW TRIAL?*
Lambert v. State'
This case marks the first time since the adoption of the
new Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure2 that the
Court of Appeals has reversed a criminal conviction where
the appeal was based upon an alleged insufficiency of the
evidence legally to sustain the conviction. Authority to
review the sufficiency of the evidence was based upon Rule
7 (c) of the new rules of criminal practice and procedure
which relates to non-jury trials and provides that "Upon
appeal the Court of Appeals may review upon both the
law and the evidence to determine whether in law the evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, but the verdict
of the trial court shall not be set aside on the evidence un-
less clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."4
Appellants Lambert, Carr, Salfner and Alder were tried
jointly by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, sitting
without a jury, on charges of violating the gambling laws.
The charges were contained in two informations, one alleg-
ing that appellants had engaged in bookmaking on October
25, 1949, and the other alleging that appellants had en-
gaged in the same activities on October 26, 1949. All the
* See Editorial Supplement to this casenote, immediately following it.
175 A. 2d 327 (Md., 1950).
1 Promulgated by the Court of Appeals on December 6th, 1949. Amended
on February 15, 1951.
8 See editorial, Criminal Procedure Reform Achieved in Maryland, 11 Md.
L. Rev. 319-324 (1950). For a discussion of the law in Maryland before the
adoption of the new rules, see note, Difeulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings
on Substantive Criminal Law - Corroboration of Accomplices, 1 Md. L. Rev.
175 (1937).
' Effective January 1st, 1950.
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testimony offered at the trial was by witnesses for the
prosecution. Officers, who had been sent to observe the
premises at 5912 Liberty Road where the bookmaking
allegedly had been carried on by appellants testified that
they had seen Lambert entering the premises sometime
after 11:30 every weekday morning for a week prior to
October 26. He was sometimes alone and on other occasions
with another man who was not identified. The officers did
not see anyone enter 5912 Liberty Road on the two Sundays
in October in which they had observed the premises.
Two telephone numbers, one of which was unpublished,
were listed, in names other than those of the appellants,
for 5912 Liberty Road. Another phone listed for 5908
Liberty Road had connections, not made by the telephone
company, leading to the basement of 5912. On October
25, the day before the premises were raided, one of the
officers called the published telephone number listed for
5912 Liberty Road. After receiving several busy signals,
he dialed the unpublished number and asked for "Froggy."
Someone answering to that name came to the phone and the
officer stated, "This is Lawrence." "Froggy" asked, "Where
did you get this number from?" The officer replied that
the other line was busy, and "Froggy" stated that he did
not take any bets on that telephone. The officer then
called the number listed for 5908 Liberty Road. The same
man's voice answered and said he was "Froggy." The
officer said "This is Lawrence again." When the officer
attempted to make a bet, "Froggy" became suspicious, say-
ing that the caller's voice did not sound like Lawrence.
"Froggy" thereupon told his caller to "Go to hell with that
bet" and hung up.
Having obtained a search warrant,5 the officers on the
afternoon of the 26th went to the premises, a two-story
frame dwelling. The officers knocked on the back door
and receiving no answer, they broke the glass and entered
into the first floor. Finding no one on that floor or on the
second, they attempted to enter the cellar, but were blocked
by a reinforced door, which they were unable to dislodge.
They therefore went out to the rear of the premises and
attempted to enter through the basement door, which was
5 The defendants attacked the validity of the search warrant on several
grounds. The Court of Appeals sustained the Trial Court's denial of defen-
dants' motion to quash holding that the defendants had no standing to
complain as they were not shown to have had any lawful right to be on
the premises.
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also reinforced. As they did so, they noticed small pieces
of paper coming out of the chimney.
When the officers finally broke into the basement, the
four appellants were observed sitting around a table playing
cards. The officers opened an oil burner and removed some
charred pieces of paper, which were later found by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to contain notations of bets
on races. The two telephones listed for 5912 Liberty Road
were concealed between the plyboard and the inner wall,
but the phone listed for 5908 was visible, and all around a
table were telephone plugs which were connected to it. The
officers also found an adding machine and about two dozen
pencils on the premises.
With this evidence before it, the trial court returned ver-
dicts of guilty against all appellants on both informations.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under the au-
thority of Rule 7 (c) ,1 the Court of Appeals emphasized that
the rule "was not intended, and will not be construed, to
permit us to reverse judgments merely because our conclu-
sion on the record is different from that of the trial judge.
It is only intended to prevent manifest error.""
After reviewing the evidence, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of all the appellants for engaging in
bookmaking on October 26th. The Court also affirmed the
conviction of appellant Lambert for the same offense on the
25th, pointing out that, although Lambert had not actually
been seen entering the premises on that date, he had been
observed entering the premises every weekday for a week
prior to the 25th. Moreover, the officer who talked to some-
one there on the 25th testified that he had talked to Lam-
bert. A fortiori, the man identified over the phone as
"Froggy" was in fact Lambert.
As to Appellants Carr, Salfner, and Alder, however, the
Court could find no evidence in the record to connect these
appellants with the premises on the 25th. They were
never identified as having been at or near the premises at
any time before the 26th. The evidence was therefore
held to have been insufficient to sustain the conviction of
the three appellants for the offense charged on the 25th,
and the judgment of the lower court finding them guilty on
that date was revsrsed.
Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 1, 332. In accord, see Edwards v. State, 81 A. 2d 631, 639 (Md.,
1951), and opinion on motion for reargument, 83 A. 2d 578 (1951) ; Lee v.
State, 84 A. 2d 63 (Md., 1951); Shelton v. State, 84 A. 2d 76 (Md., 1951);
and Diggins v. State, 84 A. 2d 845 (Md., 1951).
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In so reversing the convictions of three of the four appel-
lants upon one of the informations, the Court reversed with-
out granting new trials. There is no explanation in the
opinion for this decision. Because the determination
whether or not to grant a new trial when reversing a crim-
inal conviction for insufficient evidence is a novel one in
Maryland criminal procedure, it might be well to briefly
survey the prevailing practices in other jurisdictions which
have long since had some form of appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases.'
While in England, the Court of Criminal Appeal has no
power to order a new trial on reversal of a criminal convic-
tion, in this country according to the almost universally pre-
vailing practice, appellate courts do possess such power.'
Most applicable statutes and Rules of Court either expressly
leave the matter up to the discretion of the appellate tri-
bunal or are so interpreted as to confer such discretion upon
the court.10 A search of the leading works on criminal
law and procedure reveals that there has been a surpris-
ingly small amount of discussion devoted by most writers
to this subject. Perhaps this is in some measure attrib-
utable to the fact that in a large number of the cases, like
in the Lambert case, no reasons are assigned for the de-
cision of the appellate court to grant or not to grant a new
trial when reversing for insufficiency, 2 or if such reasons
are assigned, they are not always clearly articulated.
' No attempt has been made to make an individual state by state analysis.
Rather, a brief survey of the generally prevailing practices throughout the
country has been attempted, with particular emphasis upon the federal
procedure, see infra.
"The power to order a new trial on reversal is in line with the usual
American practice. The Court of Criminal Appeal in England has no
such power, however. The trial court cannot grant a new trial there
either. In many cases where there Is a reversal and remand for a
second trial the defendant is never brought to trial. The power to
order such a new trial seems necessary, however, to avoid the dis-
charge of guilty defendants who were tried unfairly. But the whole
administration of the criminal law ought to be improved so that no
more than one trial Is necessary. There Is much to be said for the
English view that to allow a second trial Is to harass the defendant."
ORFEILD, CRIMrNAL APPEALs iN AMERICA (1939), 278-279.
1, See state statutes listed on page 1305 of the Commentary to the
AMEICAN LAW INsTITUTv, Model Code of Criminal Procedure (1930).
Section 463 of the Model Code provides:
"When the judgment is reversed, the appellate court shall either
order that the defendant be discharged from the cause or, if It thinks
proper, grant a new triaL"
Supra, n. 1.1The writer wishes to emphasize that the only ground for reversal treated
within the scope of this note is that of insufficient evidence to sustain the
verdict. Obviously, when an appellate court reverses on some other ground,
such as faulty indictment, or erroneous admission of evidence Introduced
19531
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Typical among the reasons assigned for a determination
not to grant a new trial, 3 when, upon occasion the courts
do assign their reasons, are that it did not appear that any
more witnesses would be available for the state in a new
trial, 4 because the state had apparently fully developed
its case in the trial court, 5 because it appeared from the
record that the state could not make a better case on re-
trial, 6 because the state had conceded on appeal that the
preponderance of evidence was in the defendant's favor,"
or because it would be "unjust" to subject the defendant to
another trial after the evidence had been found insufficient
to sustain a conviction in either of two previous trials. 8
On the other hand, new trials have been granted 9
because the appellate tribunal thought that there was a
possibility that upon a new trial further corroboration
might be introduced when such corroboration was held to
have been lacking at the first trial,20 because "the justice
of the case demands" that a new trial be granted,2' because
it was felt that the facts were capable of being more fully
developed at a subsequent trial both by the state and by
the defense,22 or because of the inconclusive character of
the evidence in the trial court.23
With standards as general as these, it is not surprising
that differences in practice are to be found throughout the
country. For example, it has been held in one jurisdiction
that if there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record to
incriminate the appellant, the court must reverse without
a new trial,24 while in another jurisdiction although the
evidence "wholly failed" to connect the defendant with
the crime, the court nevertheless upon reversal remanded
for new trial "so that if the prosecutor has other evidence
by the prosecution or exclusion of evidence introduced by the defense,
different considerations apply in determining whether or not to grant a
new trial than In the case where the reversal is solely on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence.
is See cases cited in 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1950, especially n. 11,
on p. 1115, and 17 C. J.. Criminal Law, Sec. 3758, especially n. 45, on p. 370.
People v. Buxton, 362 Ill. 157, 199 N. E. 102 (1935).
U Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 485, 198 S. E. 452 (1938).
' State v. DeMoss, 338 Mo. 719, 92 S. W. 2d 112 (1936).
,State v. Pennington, 28 N. M. 543, 215 P. 815 (1923).
People v. Rubin, 366 I1. 195, 7 N. E. 2d 890 (1937).
See cases cited in 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1950, especially n. 99,
on p. 1125, and in 17 C. J., Criminal Law, Sec. 3759, especially n. 82. on p. 372.
9* People v. Romano, 300 N. Y. S. 366, 253 App. Div. 724, aff'd. 277 N. Y. 619,
14 N. E. 2d 191 (1937).
State v. Prtnslow, 140 Wisc. 131, 121 N. W. 637 (1909).
0 State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056,33 S. W. 2d 923 (1930).
0 Stephens v. State, 140 Fla. 163, 191 So. 294 (1939).
" Tool v. State, 21 Ala. App. 233, 107 So. 36 (1926).
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he may feel justified in proceeding with another trial. 25
Some courts appear to favor the granting of a new trial
after reversal except in the most extreme cases,2" while
others tend contrawise to grant new trials only when it is
obvious from the record that a better case can be made by
the state on retrial.27 In at least one jurisdiction, the de-
cision whether to grant a new trial is left to the discretion of
the trial court instead of the appellate court. 8
Even within the framework of the Federal judiciary, a
marked diversity in procedure was, at least until recently,
to be found.29 In the Ninth Circuit, in the case of Karn v.
United States,"0 it had been held that once a defendant in a
criminal proceeding properly moved for a directed verdict,
he acquired a "vested right" to acquittal, if the appellate
court did, in fact, find that the motion should have been
granted.8" In reversing under such circumstances, it was
held that the appellate court had no power to order a new
trial. The Court reasoned thusly:
"When the motion for a directed verdict was made,
the trial judge, as a matter of law, should have in-
structed the jury to render a verdict of acquittal. The
right of appellant to a verdict of acquittal fully matured
when he made his motion. To remand the case with
directions to grant new trial would, in our judgment, be
a serious invasion of rights which accrued to him in the
lower court and would strip away, without just cause,
the real effectiveness of a reversal on appeal in cases of
this kind." 2
On the other hand cases in two other circuits had for various
reasons held that upon reversal, the appellate court, at least
in the case of trial by jury, had no course but to direct a
new trial. 3
"State v. Rawson, 259 S. W. 421, 422 (Mo., 1924).
"State v. Phillips, 134 S. C. 226, 132 S. E. 610 (1926) ; State v. Klugh,
130 S. C. 160, 125 S. R_ 922 (1924).
"Atkins v. State, 27 Ala. App. 212, 169 So. 330 (1936); Sutherland v.
Commonwealth, supra, n. 15; State v. DeMoss, supra, n. 16.
"State v. Bates, 63 Idaho 119, 117 P. 2d 281 (1941).
See Annotation, Power of Federal Appellate Court to Grant New Trial
Upon Reversal of Conviction, in 94 L. Ed. 342.
"158 F. 2d 568 (9th Cir., 1946).
mThis has been termed a "novel idea" in note, United States Court of
Appeal8 May Reverse With Orders for New Trial Even Though Error Con-
sisted in Refusal of District Court to Grant Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal, 38 Geo. L. J. 680 (1960).
:Supra, n. 30, 573. (Italics supplied.)
"Tatcher v. United States, 107 F. 2d 31d (3rd Cir., 1939) ; United States
v. Ward, 168 F. 2d 226 (3rd Cir., 1948) ; Collenger v. United States, 50 F. 2d
345 (7th Cir., 1931).
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This conflict has apparently been resolved in the recent
case of Bryan v. United States.8 4 In this the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had reversed a con-
viction for insufficient evidence and ordered a new trial3 5
The defendant contended that Rule 29 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure"6 required that the court direct
judgment of acquittal rather than grant a new trial. The
Supreme Court held that the decision whether or not to
grant a new trial was a matter for the discretion of the
Courts of Appeals. Rule 29 (a) was held to have reference
only to the conduct of the trial in the District Court, and
therefore did not abrogate the authority of the appellate
tribunals to grant a new trial under the applicable statute,"
which provided that:
"The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or re-
verse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully
brought before it for review, and may remand the cause
and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, de-
cree, or order, or require such further proceedings to
be had as may be just under circumstances."3 8
It seems to the writer that there is a good deal to be said
for the practice prevailing in some jurisdictions of granting
new trials only in the most extreme cases when reversing
for insufficiency. It is true that there is no double jeopardy
in the constitutional sense when a new trial is granted, 9
but it is also true that the defendant is once again subject
to penal sanctions, although, had the trial court properly
granted his request for a directed verdict, he would be im-
mune from further prosecution. In other words, had the
"338 U. S. 552 (1950).
175 F. 2d 223.(5th Cir., 1949).
- "Motion For Judgment of Acquittal. Motions for directed verdict
are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in
their place. The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion
shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses
charged In the indictment or information after the evidence on either
side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of
such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the government is not
granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved
the right."
w 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 2106.
- Black and Reed, JJ., in a separate opinion In the Bryan case, supra,
n. 34, 560, took the position that Rule 29(a) required the Appellate Court,
upon reversal, to remand to the district court, the latter having discretion
to either dismiss or order a new trial.
0 Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521 (1905) ; Francis v. Resweber, 329
U. S. 459 (1947).
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trial court done its job properly (as the appellate court now
says it should have done) the defendant would be free and
not subject to retrial.
A second reason for the desirability of adopting a policy
of reluctance in granting new trials when reversing a
criminal conviction for insufficient evidence lies in the
desideratum of having as few second or third prosecutions
for the same offense as possible. Procedural reforms in
criminal law in recent years have constantly sought to
attain final disposition of the trial at the earliest possible
stage in the proceedings."0 The growing practice of grant-
ing judgments N. 0. V. is a leading example. The adminis-
tration of justice can best be served in the great majority of
cases by limiting the proceedings to a single trial and a
single appeal.
Moreover, it seems unfair, as some courts have ap-
parently held, to rest the decision whether or not to remand
or to dismiss with the prosecutor. Even though the prose-
cutor may feel that he will be able to muster more evidence
at a retrial, the appellate court should not allow the prose-
cutor's wishes to-be the controlling consideration. It should
be remembered that the accused under our conceptions of
justice and fair play was entitled to a final and speedy
determination of his guilt or innocence, and the prosecutor
should have introduced all available evidence at the first
trial. To the general policy of not granting new trials
except in the most extreme cases, there is one important
qualification. That is the situation where the appellate
court, in reversing for insufficiency, is in effect setting forth
a new rule of law. Thus in the guise of passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the
court may in fact be asked to determine a rule of law upon
which there was substantial disagreement at the lower
level. In such a case, it would appear to be perfectly proper
for the appellate court to consider whether or not the pros-
ecution can produce more evidence at a subsequent trial.
If it believes that the prosecution can produce such addi-
tional evidence, and there are no special circumstances mak-
ing it unjust to subject the defendant to further prosecution,
a new trial should be granted.
Under the new Rules of Criminal Practice and Proce-
dure, the Court of Appeals will be faced with many novel
situations which can only be worked out on a case to case
basis. Not the least of these is the determination whether
40 See O mD, oo. oil., supro, n. 9.
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or not to grant a new trial when reversing a criminal con-
viction for insufficient evidence. The writer feels that the
ends of justice can best be served in most instances by
refusing to remand for a new trial except in the most
extreme cases. In the interest of developing a uniform
policy, the Court should always attempt to clearly articulate
its reasons for granting or refusing to grant a new trial.
In the face of wide diversity in procedures in other jurisdic-
tions, it would be well for the Court of Appeals to give
serious consideration to this problem.
Editorial Supplement to Lambert v. State
Since the above casenote was written the Court of
Appeals has decided two cases which have some bearing on
the subject. The first of these was Wright v. State.4 1 This
case involved an indictment for bigamy, charging that
defendant married B in 1947, and while still legally married
to her, had married C in 1948. Defendant produced a
marriage certificate showing he was married to A in Florida
in 1941, and there was no evidence to show this marriage
had been terminated. The lower court refused to advise
an acquittal, but submitted the case to the jury, with
advisory instructions, which returned a verdict of guilty.
The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial,
holding that the proof of the Florida marriage, without
proof of its termination, was a good defense. The Court
of Appeals pointed out that the case below was tried on
November 30th, 1950, at a time when an instruction to the
jury as to legal insufficiency of evidence could be advisory
merely.42 The Court concluded that the evidence was not
legally sufficient to convict, and that the trial judge should
have so instructed the jury. The case does not seem to be
of much help, as it is uncertain from the opinion whether
the Court of Appeals, having found that the evidence was
insufficient,' granted the new trial because that was its
only course, in light of the fact that such an instruction
could have been advisory merely at the time the case was
tried below. It is noteworthy that the opinion gives no
other reason for awarding a new trial.
-81 A. 2d 602 (Md., 1951).
U Ibid, 605-6. The Court also pointed out that the constitutional amend-
ment which changed this rule became effective December 1, 1960, and that
the Court subsequently adopted Rule 5A, permitting the lower court to give
a mandatory instruction of not guilty.
[VOL. XIII
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The second case was Estep v. State," in which the Court
of Appeals, for the first time, gives a reason for granting a
new trial. In that case, by a 3 to 2 decision, they reversed a
criminal conviction with a new trial. The case was tried
below without a jury, and the majority opinion said the
evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Although there was proof that a pregnant woman had
come to defendant to procure an abortion (for which she
paid him $150.) and that he had given her "a shot in the
arm", there was no evidence produced by the State as to
what drug was used therefor. Another physician, to whom
she went subsequently, testified that in his opinion, there
was no drug one dose of which would produce such a result.
The majority and minority opinions differed on the inter-
pretation of this physican's testimony:
The majority opinion concluded:
"Since, however, the sole reason for reversal is the
insufficiency of evidence, and this may be supplied by
the State, we think the appellant should not now be
allowed to go free without giving an opportunity for
its production. We will therefore remand the case for a
new trial. Wright v. State .... Md. ..... 81 A. 2d 602."
The Court of Appeals in this case seems to be laying
down the rule that it will award a new trial, where it is
apparent (from the record) that the State may be able to
produce evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. This
appears to be along the lines of the cases cited in notes 20
and 22 of the casenote, although the majority opinion cited
only Wright v. State on this point, and made no attempt to
indicate an overall policy governing the awarding of new
trials.
Thus, for non-jury cases we have the contrast of the
Lambert and the Estep cases, the one without, the other
with a new trial, explained only on the basis of the record's
showing a possibility of mustering more evidence.
For jury cases we have hardly a hint, inasmuch as the
Wright case was tried during the period of the original
Criminal Rules when the directed verdict was only ad-
visory, and the case still went to the jury, which might
always disregard the instruction, even on a new trial with
the instruction granted.
Perhaps now that the directed verdict is mandatory, the
defendant is the more entitled to insist that the case is
" 86 A. 2d 470 (Md., 1951).
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closed. This would indicate that the answer will be in jury
cases the same as in non-jury, as indicated above, i~e., that
it depends on whether it is apparent that more evidence
could be produced.
In this connection it should be remembered that review
of the sufficiency of the evidence means two different things,
i.e., of the weight of the evidence to sustain guilt of what is
conceded to be a crime as a matter of law; and also the
criminality of the act charged and proved by admittedly
weighty evidence. In the latter case, no new trial should
be indicated, in either jury or non-jury cases.
One final point is, what happens when a defendant is
convicted on two or more counts, where the trial court was
right in refusing a directed verdict on one, and wrong in
refusing as to the other? In the comparable problem of
joint defendants, with the evidence insufficient as to one
only, the Lambert case indicates a practice of reversing as
to him, and affirming as to the rest. But, if there be an
appearance of added evidence, would they order a new
trial as to him?
A similar problem that may cause trouble is this: Under
Maryland practice a single count for "murder" allows of
three possible homicide convictions, first degree murder,
second degree murder, and manslaughter. If there be
sufficient evidence of second, but not of first, and the court
refuses to direct against first and the jury convicts of that,
what may the Court of Appeals do upon reversing the first
degree conviction for insufficiency?
Some states have procedures allowing the court on
appeal to reverse as to the improper higher count and sub-
stitute a lower count as to which the evidence is sufficient,
but it probably would take a definite rule or statute to
accomplish this in Maryland, unless the present rules about
insufficiency can so be interpreted. ,
[VOL. XIII
